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T he final chapter was written recently on the United States Court of
Claims, a court which from its creation in 1855 had served as the
nation's conscience.' The existence of this court, which had served long
and well in carrying out the task of a sovereign rendering justice against
itself, along with the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), was terminated on October 1, 1982, and replaced by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and the United States Claims
Court (USCC).' It is not the purpose of this paper to outline the history
*Judge, United States Claims Court. B.E.E., University of Detroit; LL.B., George Wash-
ington University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the United States Claims Court.
' President Abraham Lincoln understood the true mission of the court when he stated in
an address to Congress: "It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice
against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same, between private individu-
als." First Annual Message to Congress, 7 MESSAGES AND PAP'ERS OF THE PRESIDENT 3252,
reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 2. (1861).
' On April 2, 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified throughout sections of titles 2,
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of the Court of Claims as that task has been done adequately by others.'
Rather, my aim is to discuss the changes which practitioners may expect
in bringing patent suits against the United States in the new Claims
Court.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to provide the perspective needed for an appreciation of the
changes in patent litigation which have occurred with the creation of the
USCC, it is essential to explain briefly its jurisdictional basis and the
manner in which patent suits were tried before the old Court of Claims.
A. Jurisdictional Bases of Patent Suits
Although suits involving patents were before the Court of Claims from
its inception," it is fair to say that its patent jurisdiction evolved slowly.
Indeed, during the early formative years, recovery for patent infringe-
ment was grounded on an implied-in-fact contract. Under this theory, it
was necessary for the patentee to show that he had submitted his pat-
ented invention to the government with the intention that it be used, and
that the government used the invention with the understanding that it
would have to pay. In Schillinger v. United States,' the court carefully
distinguished between an action by a patentee for infringement of his
patent, a tort claim over which the court had no jurisdiction, and the
situation in which a patentee had submitted his invention under circum-
stances which established an implied-in-fact contract over which the
court would have jurisdiction.'
5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45 and 50 app. U.S.C.
(1982)).
3 See W. COWEN, R. NICHOLS, JR., & M. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS,
A HISTORY, PART II, ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855-1978 (reprinted in 216 Ct.
Cl. I).
' The first suit involving a patent was referred to the court by Congress on March 3,
1855, and concerned a request by Cyrus H. McCormick, the inventor of the first workable
harvester, to extend the life of his expired patent. See McCormick v. United States,
H.R. REP. C.C. No. 11, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 Cong. Ct. Cl. (1855-56).
5 24 Ct. Cl. 278 (1889), aff'd, 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
6 The Court of Claims in Schillinger made this important distinction by noting:
A careful examination of these cases shows that a contract to pay is implied
whenever the Government, acting through a competent agent, takes or uses indi-
vidual property, acknowledging explicitly or tacitly that the property is individual
property. No formal proceedings in condemnation are necessary to this result.
Where, however, there is a denial of private right in an alleged patent, and the
invention is nevertheless appropriated or used by the Government, the appropria-
tion or use is in the nature of a tort, and an action thereon is not within the
general jurisdiction of this court. So if it had not been disputed that the Schillin-
ger patent was valid and the invention had been used by the Government, acting
through a competent agent, a contract for royalty would be implied.
[Vol. 32:25
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This limited approach by the Court of Claims to the problem of com-
pensating patentees for the government's use of their inventions persisted
until 1910, when Congress passed an act to provide additional protection
to owners of United States patents.7 An interesting discussion of the
Court of Claims' early attempts to redress a patentee for the alleged use
of his patented invention and the impact of the 1910 Act on the court's
jurisdiction is found in Crozier v. Krupp.8 However, that case is equally
important because of the Supreme Court's conclusion that a patentee
who had sought to enjoin the United States was entitled to be compen-
sated under the 1910 Act only for the government's eminent domain tak-
ing of a license under the patent in suit. In denying the plaintiff's right
for a permanent injunction, the Supreme Court pointed out that:
[C]learly under the circumstances now existing, that is, the ac-
quiring by the Government under the right of eminent domain, as
the result of the statute of 1910, of a license to use the patented
inventions in question, there could be no possible right to award
at the end of a trial the permanent injunction to which the issue
in the case was confined. Moreover, taking a broader view and
supposing that a final decree granting a permanent injunction
had been entered below, in view of the subject-matter of the con-
troversy and the right of the United States to exert the power of
eminent domain as to that subject, at most and in any event the
injunction could rightfully only have been made to operate until
the United States had appropriated the right to use the patented
inventions, and as that event has happened the injunction, if
granted, would no longer have operative force.9
While Crozier clearly established that the United States never could
be enjoined directly from taking a license under a United States patent,1"
the possibility of enjoining a contractor of the United States remained
unresolved. It was not until William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine
Building Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co.11 that the Su-
preme Court concluded that the 1910 Act did not prevent a patentee
from suing a government contractor in district court for infringement of
its patent. Coming as it did at the height of World Warl I, Cramp sent
24 Ct. Cl. at 298.
" Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1982)). This Act provided in pertinent part that "whenever an invention described in and
covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter be used by the United States with-
out license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use the same, such owner may recover
reasonable compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims. Id.
- 224 U.S. 290 (1912).
9 Id. at 308-09.
'0 In Crozier the plaintiff sued an officer and agent of the United States in a district
court.
11 246 U.S. 28 (1918).
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shockwaves through various government agencies which feared that the
ultimate unthinkable result could be that a district court could enjoin a
United States contractor from supplying equipment which was crucial to
the government's war effort."2 To prevent this possibility, Congress
amended the Act of 1910 to provide that a patentee's remedy for the unli-
censed use or manufacture of an invention by or for the United States
"shall be by suit against the United States in the Court of Claims for the
recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture." ' s
In Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States4 the Supreme Court
again was faced with the task of unravelling the rights of a patent owner
against the government, but this time the litigation was even more com-
plicated because the rights of a contractor were also involved. This case
finally settled the important question of a patentee's rights against a gov-
ernment contractor. The Supreme Court left no doubt that a patentee's
exclusive right was against the government:
The intention and purpose of Congress in the Act of 1918 was to
stimulate contractors to furnish what was needed for the War,
without fear of becoming liable themselves for infringements to
inventors or the owners or assignees of patents. The letter of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, upon which the Act of 1918 was
passed, leaves no doubt that this was the occasion for it. To ac-
complish this governmental purpose, Congress exercised the
power to take away the right of the owner of the patent to recover
from the contractor for infringements.' 5
B. Evolution of the 1910 Act Into the Court's Present Patent
Jurisdiction
The Act of June 25, 1910, as amended by the Act of July 1, 1918, has
evolved into section 1498 of title 28 and provides, as it did in the Court of
Claims, the jurisdictional basis of all patent suits in the new United
States Claims Court. Indeed, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 deleted all reference to the Court of Claims and transferred all such
jurisdiction to the USCC.' 6 Thus, the USCC has exclusive jurisdiction
over all suits brought against the United States for the unlicensed use or
manufacture of a patented device.
12 See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343-45 (1928), rev'g 61
Ct. Cl. 397 (1925), for a discussion of the rights of a patentee against a government supplier.
,S Naval Appropriation Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982)).
275 U.S. 331 (1928).
' Id. at 345.
,6 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(d), 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
[Vol. 32:25
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C. The Commissioner System
Contemporaneous with the clarification of the Court of Claim's patent
jurisdiction an event occurred which was to have a profound effect on the
way that future patent litigation would be conducted in the court. The
end of World War I signalled an onslaught of new activity for the Court
of Claims. By 1924 new filings amounted to nearly 100 per week, in con-
trast to the 181 cases which were filed during all of 1918.'1 It was appar-
ent that the court was overwhelmed and that a plan was needed to ease
the overload. The judges at the court were in favor of increasing their
number temporarily to nine by the appointment of four new judges.'8
However, a different and more novel approach was recommended by the
Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate. The committee felt
that the crisis at the court could be better solved by the appointment of
seven commissioners to perform functions similar to those which masters
now perform in the district courts. 9 The duties of these new commission-
ers were to include the examination of witnesses, the taking of evidence,
and the finding and reporting of the facts to the court. The commission-
ers were to serve for only three years.
There can be no doubt that the 1925 legislation 20 was a signal event in
the evolutionary change of the court. It was not long after this that Con-
gress raised the salaries of the Court of Claims article III judges to the
same level as judges of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and
thus set the stage for their inclusion years later in the ranks of federal
appellate judges.2 Moreover, after the three-year provision of the 1925
Act had run, the original commissioners remained, the three-year provi-
sion being repealed in 1930. The concept was so well received that by
1953, Congress had authorized the installation of fifteen commissioners.
From this small beginning, the commissioner system at the Court of
Claims grew in power. For example, by 1948, the commissioners, when
directed by the court, could recommend conclusions of law, as well as
findings of fact. The authorization to make recommendations of law be-
came mandatory by order of the court on September 23, 1964, in all cases
in which findings of fact were made. By 1982, the last year of the Court of
Claims, there were sixteen trial judges who performed all of the formal
trial functions of the court. The enhanced standing which the trial judges
finally attained is illustrated by Rule 13 of the United States Court of
" W. COWEN, R. NICHOLS, JR., & M. BENNETf, supra note 3, at 85-88.
"s The increase was to be temporary, for as the judges retired or died, these positions
would not be refilled, and in time the court would revert to its original five judges. Id.
'9 While commissioners had served the Court of Claims from its inception, in reality the
early appointees served as court reporters and only presided at the taking of depositions.
2 Act of February 24, 1925, ch. 301, 43 Stat. 964 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2503 (1982)).
21 Congress, in its Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 171 (1982)), declared that the Court of Claims was an article III court.
1983-841
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Claims, which was in effect until October 1, 1982.22
II. SPECIALIZATION OF TRIAL JUDGES
Thus, over the years, the Court of Claims changed from the simple five-
judge trial court originally planned by the Act of 1855, into a two-division
operation. The appellate division was manned by seven article III judges,
while sixteen trial judges comprised the trial division. The court had ju-
risdiction over a broad range of claims, including tax refunds, patent in-
fringement, inverse condemnation cases, civilian and military pay, gov-
ernment contracts, Indian claims, and renegotiation board cases. The
court, many years ago, recognized that in order to handle expeditiously
its wide range of extremely complex litigation, its trial judges should be
selected from the ranks of attorneys having a knowledge of the law relat-
ing to the various specialities over which the court had jurisdiction. In-
deed, because of the large number of pending tax refund cases, the Court
of Claims at one time had three trial judges who were specialists in that
area. Similarly, persons having knowledge in the fields of civilian pay,
military pay, and government contracts were also appointed as trial
judges of the court.
The Court of Claims probably had more patent litigation pending
before it than any other federal court. Between 1966 and October 1982,
all of these cases were divided between two patent-trained trial judges.23
In addition to dividing the patent cases, which have ranged from a high
of about ninety in 1965, to fifty in 1982, the dockets of these trial judges
have always included cases from every area of the court's jurisdiction.
III. PATENT LITIGATION THEN AND Now
A. Substantive and Procedural Issues
As explained above, section 1498 of title 28 endowed the Court of
21 Ct. Cl. R. 13 (28 U.S.C. app. (1976)). This Rule provided in pertinent part:
(a) General: The trial judges shall constitute the trial division of the court and
shall have the power, to the extent authorized by statute and these rules, to do
and perform any acts which may be necessary or proper for the efficient perform-
ance of their duties and the regulation of proceedings before them.
(b) Responsibility: In all cases referred to him, the trial judge shall be responsible
in the first instance (1) for all orders requisite to the joinder of issue on the plead-
ings; (2) for the disposition of procedural motions; (3) for the direction and con-
duct of pretrial proceedings (including discovery and depositions); (4) for the trial
of issues of fact; (5) for making findings of fact; and (6) unless otherwise directed
by the court, or otherwise provided by these rules, for submitting his recom-
mended decision.
Id.
"s The author presently shares substantially all of the patent cases with Judge Robert
M.M. Seto, although Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and Judge Kenneth R. Harkins each have
at least one patent case on their dockets.
[Vol. 32:25
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Claims with exclusive jurisdiction in patent infringement cases against
the United States. While such an action is in reality a suit for just com-
pensation for the unauthorized taking of a nonexclusive license under a
patent, the substantive law used by both the old Court of Claims and the
new United States Claims Court will remain virtually the same as that
used in patent litigation by United States district courts.2 4 Thus, similar
to the procedure followed in the district court litigation, all patent trials
have been and will continue to be divided into liability and accounting
phases, with the accounting trial being deferred until liability has been
finally established.2 5 Moreover, although patent litigation in the United
States district courts is based on theories of tort, while patent litigation
in the United States Claims Court is founded on a governmental taking
by eminent domain, those differences are not significant until the ac-
counting trial when the damages to which the patentee is entitled are
calculated.26 The crucial determination of the liability trial will continue
4 See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (holdings of
predecessor courts binding as precedent on new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
See also Cl. Ct. Gen. Order No. 1, Prec. R. 1, 28 U.S.C. (1982) (issued by Kozinski, C.J., on
October 7, 1982).
25 It is also important to note that all suits in the Claims Court are heard by the judges of
that court and the parties are not entitled to a jury trial.
20 The significance of these different approaches to patent litigation was pointed out by
the Court of Claims in Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1979):
[The Court of Claims] has traditionally searched the law of eminent domain for
legal precedents and principles to apply in determining the "reasonable and entire
compensation" to be granted in a valid infringement action against the govern-
ment ...
The trial judge used the language of § 1498 to justify the award of double
damages, profits, savings to the government, and the attorneys' fees in addition to
a reasonable royalty he deemed due plaintiff for infringement. .
The trial judge progressed from the conclusion that reasonable and entire com-
pensation meant that the United States was assuming liability for more than the
fifth amendment's mandated just compensation, to the view that reasonable and
entire compensation included more than a reasonable royalty, the traditional
benchmark used to measure just compensation for a taking of patent rights. He
concluded that § 1498 was a substitute for Title 35, the section of the United
States Code granting remedies to patentees and their assignees injured by private
parties. Therefore, he concluded that the remedy of "reasonable and entire" com-
pensation awarded under § 1498 would be defined to include most of the elements
of Title 35. The injunctive relief of 35 U.S.C. § 263 could not be awarded, of
course, since this court lacks the power to grant such relief.
... A complete congruence between § 1498 and Title 35 would grant plain-
tiff a recovery in excess of the just compensation required by the fifth amend-
ment, and in excess of the reasonable and entire compensation contemplated by
Congress with the passage of § 1498. The difficulties with. . . [the] incorporation
of Title 35 into the definition of a § 1498 recovery can be seen in certain elements
of the award he granted Leesona.
Id. at 967-69 (citations omitted).
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to be whether the invention in controversy is patentable under section
103 of title 35 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John
Deere Co.2 7 Moreover, the judges of the new USCC shall be called upon,
just as the trial judges of the Court of Claims were, to establish if the
government has infringed any of the claims of the patent in suit.2 Simi-
larly, a host of technical and legal defenses are capable of being raised,
which will require resolution by today's judges as they were required to
be resolved by yesterday's.
B. The Case Against the Fungible Case Docket
1. Detrimental Aspects of Random Case Assignment
While the procedural and substantive issues raised by patent litigation
in the new USCC will remain the same as those raised before the old
Court of Claims, very little else may remain the same. Indeed, the hall-
mark of patent litigation before the Court of Claims, that which more
than anything else brought favorable comment from the patent bar, will
no longer be available in the new USCC: the opportunity of the petition-
ers to try all patent cases before patent-trained judges. This change may
have far-reaching effects on the way patent cases will be tried in the new
court, and adjustments by both the bench and the bar will be necessary.
Some may argue that the change was needed; however, in truth it was
not. For reasons detailed below, the random assignment of patent cases
will not be viewed in the long run as a beneficial change by either the
judges at the new court or by the practitioners who litigate there.
Under the new USCC Rules, all Claims Court cases are assigned to
judges on a random basis. The Rules provide:
27 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The Graham analysis centers on § 103 of the Patent Act of 1952,
ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976)). That Act prevents the pat-
entability of subject matter which would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill
in the relevant art. (In addition, §§ 101 and 102 of the Act made patentability dependent on
the novelty and utility of the invention.) Graham held that the shipper-sprayer in question
was not patent-worthy, as the invention rested only on "exceedingly small and quite non-
technical mechanical differences in a device which was old in the art." 383 U.S. at 36. See
also Kistler Instruments A.G. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1303 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (secondary
considerations, such as commercial success or satisfaction of a long-felt need may reflect on
a determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
28 The government is held to have infringed a licensee's patent under the doctrine of
equivalents if it takes advantage of the licensee's invention by using another only slightly
different. In Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Lind Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950), the Su-
preme Court stated, "'if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in
name, form, or shape.'" Id. at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877)). See also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (even
if equipment in question literally reads on the claims in suit, accused device must also be
shown to substantially infringe licensee's patent by performing same work, in substantially
same manner to achieve substantially the same result).
[Vol. 32:25
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After the complaint has been served on the United States, or
after recusal or disqualification of a judge to whom a case has
been assigned, the case shall be assigned forthwith to a judge on
the basis of random selection by the clerk, except that related
cases shall be assigned to the judge who has been assigned the
earliest case filed. With the consent of the judge to whom a case
has been assigned, the chief judge may reassign any case if he
deems such action necessary for the efficient administration of
justice.29
However, the assignment of patent cases to the judges of the USCC on
a random basis not only ignores the results achieved by the Court of
Claims over the last thirty years, but also flies in the face of the advice of
some of the best judicial minds who have reflected on the subject. No less
an authority than Justice Felix Frankfurter remarked in his dissent in
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States"0 that "[ilt is an old
observation that the training of the Anglo-American judges ill fits them
to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation.
31 While
this may be felt by some to be an overstatement, it is this author's feeling
that it does not miss the mark by much. In fact, if we are to believe the
comments of Judge Abraham L. Marovitz, Justice Frankfurter merely ar-
ticulated the feeling held by judges generally. Concerning Justice Frank-
furter's dissent, Judge Marovitz said:
I sometimes think that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had judges
like me in mind .. . in his dissent in Marconi Wireless Co. v.
United States . . . . That observation . . . voiced by Justice
Frankfurter in 1943 .. .to a certain degree is as true today as it
was thirty years ago.
s2
Judge Marovitz explained that cases in the Northern District of Illinois
are assigned by lot, just as they are at the USCC. His description of the
fear of being assigned a patent case is pertinent:
[W]hen I drew an antitrust case, a multi-defendant criminal
case, or an involved securities case, I was unperturbed. Neverthe-
less, when I drew a patent case, to be perfectly honest, I was less
than overjoyed. I envisioned inordinate amounts of trial time,
mountains of documents, reams of testimony, countless mysteri-
ous diagrams, and endless verbal duels between experts who
speak in a foreign tongue and write in an alien language. I was
overcome by a feeling that I was being compelled to perform in a
29 C1. Ct. R. 77(f).
:0 320 U.S. 1 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 60-61.
22 Marovitz, Patent Cases in the District Courts- Who Should Hear Them?, 58 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 760, 760 (1976).
1983-84]
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role for which I was dreadfully ill prepared, and to witness thejudicial system operating at its poorest. I might venture to guess
that these feelings are not unusual among patent-inexperienced
judges in the federal judiciary."
Such sentiments cannot be dismissed as rare; rather, they are typical of
an attitude which appears with disturbing regularity in patent cases.
I do not mean to imply that only patent-trained judges are capable ofhandling patent litigation, for this, of course, is not true. The subject
matter can be handled in an exemplary fashion by any judge who is will-ing to invest the time and energy to learn about a subject which has been
totally ignored by the majority of the lawyers and judges in this country.The random assignment of patent cases in the new USCC will require a
willingness on the part of its judges to commit vast expenditures of trial
time and out-of-court study time to familiarize themselves with the tech-
nical subject-matter of such cases. Unfortunately, time is the one thing
which judges of the Claims Court may have little of. In Judge Marovitz's
view:
[T]here is something beyond the outward appearance of patent
cases that is responsible for the large amounts of time necessary.
Antitrust and securities cases are also inherently time consuming.
They too involve multiple defendants and plaintiffs and large
amounts of money, yet they are resolved more efficiently than
patent cases. Why? The simple answer is that a judge has en-
Id. at 761-62. Other judges have expressed similar reservations with regard to patentlitigation. For example, Senior Circuit Judge Woodbury in Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342F.2d 531 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1965), stated:
The patents are long. One consists of 11 pages of drawings (26 figures) and
almost 50 columns of text, and the other 9 pages of drawings (21 figures) and
almost 44 columns of text. Both are highly technical in the fields of advanced
mathematics and electrical engineering in which no member of this court can pro-fess any competence. We can say with the court below that this case presentsgreat difficulties to judges like ourselves who have only the most elementary train-ing in science and mathematics and little experience with modern technological
developments.
Resolution of [the plaintiff's) contention takes us into the construction and
operation of generators and motors in general and then leads on into technicaldetails many of which we find beyond our comprehension, for the plaintiff's pat-
ents are not only voluminous but are couched in a technical vocabulary with
which we are wholly unfamiliar. We frankly admit that we cannot read them intel-ligently. . . . Moreover, we have great difficulty in understanding, even in a gen-
eral way, the technical testimony of the experts and the discussion of that testi-
mony by counsel orally and in their briefs. However, we must do the best we can.Id. at 532-33 (footnote omitted). Another example is the remark of Judge Wortendyke
who, after quoting the above language of Judge Woodbury, laments: "The undersigned is
equally ignorant in the scientific field involved in the patent in suit." Kraftco Corp. v. Bea-
trice Foods Co., 342 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (D.N.J. 1971).
[Vol. 32:25
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countered the elements of these areas of law on numerous occa-
sions, both in his practice prior to being appointed to the bench,
and afterwards, and he is therefore intimately familiar with their
terms, language, and underlying circumstances. Patent litigation,
on the other hand, is infrequently encountered by judges and
even less frequently, if ever, dealt with by practicing non-patent
lawyers.1
4
Unfortunately, the judges at the USCC may find, just as many of the
district court judges have, that while reaching a decision in a non-patent
case requires the three-step process of determining the facts, choosing the
applicable statutory or case law, and applying the law to the facts, an
additional step is required in all patent litigation: learning the technical
language needed to understand the invention.
3 5
In addition, from the point of view of counsel, the random assignment
of patent cases will require changes in the way cases are tried. Counsel
under the Court of Claims practice were assured of trying their cases
before judges who had engineering degrees and who were familiar with
the law and language of patents. This assurance no longer holds true. No
longer can counsel assume that the judge will be familiar with, for exam-
ple, the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel or the duties of honesty and
candor on the part of counsel when they are prosecuting an application of
a patent through the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Thus when
speaking of such esoterica as file wrapper estoppel or fraud in the Patent
Office, it will be necessary for counsel to cover these areas with a much
greater degree of care. It may also be prudent to consider having an ex-
pert assist the court by explaining such things as the way a patent is
prosecuted through the PTO and other matters foreign to the court.
The random assignment of patent cases may also affect the attitude of
" Marovitz, supra note 32, at 763. This sentiment echoes the thought expressed years
earlier by Judge Learned Hand:
-I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the
law which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudi-
ments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these. The inordinate expense
of time is the least of the resulting evils, for only a trained chemist is really capa-
ble of passing upon such facts, e.g., in this case the chemical character of Von
Furth's so-called "zinc compound," or the presence of inactive organic substances.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
35
Aside from discerning the facts and segregating the law, a judge must learn an
entirely new technical and foreign language -call it "patenteese" if you will. It is
principally the language of physics, chemistry, and engineering-a language with
which the judge has no familiarity-both in regard to underlying circumstances,
and to the very terms used. It is a jargon in which a judge must be re-educated
before he can proceed to properly understand the basic facts and to render a
proper decision.
Marovitz, supra note 32, at 764.
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counsel regarding settlement. While a certain predictability existed when
patent cases were tried before patent-trained judges, this may no longer
be true with the random assignment of patent cases to non-patent-
trained judges. The change may result in a drop in settlements over the
next several years. In a 1979 speech before the American Patent Law As-
sociation in Washington, D.C., Mr. Vito J. DiPietro, then the Assistant
Director of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division, De-
partment of Justice, reported that of the fifty-four patent cases con-
cluded between the years 1975 and 1979, twenty were settled.3 6 It remains
to be seen whether counsel for both plaintiff and defendant will feel that
the uncertainty which the new system brings to the trial will improve
each of their chances for success and thus make each less willing to nego-
tiate a settlement. While this may be the unfortunate short-term effect of
random assignment, the situation should improve as time goes on.
2. The Verdict from Abroad
The random assignment of patent cases in the new Claims Court not
only breaks with a thirty year tradition established by the Court of
Claims-it also counters the increasing tendency of technically-oriented
foreign countries to refer patent litigation to patent-trained judges. As
early as 1911, Judge Hand, in the Parke-Davis case, favorably com-
mented on the progressive step taken in Germany to use technically
trained judges to hear and decide patent cases. His plea for a similar
practice in this country, although largely unheeded outside of the Court
of Claims, is nonetheless noteworthy:
In Germany, where the national spirit eagerly seeks for all the
assistance it can get from the whole range of human knowledge,
they do quite differently. The court summons technical judges to
whom technical questions are submitted and who can intelligently
pass upon the issues without blindly groping among testimony
upon matters wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue
to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one
knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial le-
gal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such
advance.3 7
Since Judge Hand's appeal, the British have turned to patent-trained
judges to hear all patent infringement suits. One commentator, Richard
L. Gausewitz, has written: "In this age, when it is becoming common to
do something about problems-not just talk about them-the United
"" Address by Vito J. DiPietro, APLA Spring Meeting (May 23-25, 1979), reprinted in
1979 Am. Pat. L.A. Bull. 359, 386.
37 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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States should follow the lead of other major industrial nations of the free
world by initiating some reasonable form of judicial specialization in pat-
ent cases." '88 His conclusion is based largely on the favorable experience
of the British. Since 1945 the English Patents and Design Act has called
for the addition of a patent lawyer to the English High Court (its trial
court) to deal primarily with patent cases. Further, the requirement that
all patent infringement matters in England be tried before "patent law-
yers turned judges" has proven to be so successful that it prompted the
following recommendation to Parliament:
It is an important corollary to the establishment of a special Pat-
ents Court that the Court of Appeal should also dispose of some
patent expertise. We note with satisfaction that one of the spe-
cialist judges recently sat as a member of the Court of Appeal
when that court was hearing a Registered Design action and we
believe that this should be the practice for every patent action if
there is no judge with patent experience in the Court of
Appeal. 9
Resort to patent-trained judges to hear all patent infringement litiga-
tion is not limited to Germany and England. Similar referrals are made in
Japan.40
3. Judicial Approval of the Patent-Specialized Docket
Judges have, for good reason, consistently resisted the urge to special-
ize. This is true not only with regard to specialization on an individual
judge basis, but also extends to the establishment of specialized courts.
However, this resistance toward specialization persists only until the sub-
ject of patent litigation is raised, whereupon the bench almost unani-
mously shifts its position to favor specialization. Thus, while nonspecial-
ization is generally encouraged, the majority of judges still would favor
the handling of patent litigation by judges expert in that field. Judge
Marovitz may well have expressed this majority view when he
commented:
I agree wholeheartedly that a federal judge, given his exalted
position, should be a good enough lawyer to handle anything that
comes his way-and that there is a great danger in segmenting
the courts and judges into specialized areas-but such statements
beg the question. The issue is not whether a judge can or ought to
train himself to properly handle patent cases, but rather whether
s Gausewitz, Toward Patent-Experienced Judges, 58 A.B.A. J. 1087, 1090 (1972).
Id. at 1089 (quoting BANKS COMMITTEE, REPORT TO PARLIAMENT at 1 180 (1970)) (em-
phasis added).
40 Id. at 1090.
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he should be required to do so given the large amount of time it
requires. My thesis then, given the critical drain on judicial time
that can be attributed to assignment of patent cases to patent-
inexperienced judges, given the uniqueness of patent litigation,
and given the alternatives for the preservation of that time, is
that patent cases should not be assigned to patent-inexperienced
judges."'
C. Beneficial Effects of the 1982 Federal Courts Improvement Act on
Patent Litigation
The 1982 Federal Courts Improvement.Act and the random assign-
ment of patent cases at the USCC are more than academic topics raised
for the mere purpose of discussion. It is appropriate to consider the prac-
tical effects which these changes will have on patent litigation before the
court.
There can be no doubt that the hearings during the legislative pen-
dency of the Federal Courts Improvement Act focused primarily on the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It is fair to say,
having attended a meeting at which Assistant Attorney General Daniel J.
Meador discussed his proposal of merging the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, that the need for a court to handle
the trial functions of the Court of Claims was an afterthought. This is
evident from Judge Jack R. Miller's article, where, in discussing Assistant
Attorney General Meador's proposal, he stated:
Already we have been hearing informal criticisms of this propo-
sal, such as. . . what to do with the 16 Court of Claims Commis-
sioners, who are neither Article I nor Article III judges but whose
decisions would have to be "final" in the same sense as those of
the U.S. District Courts and the Tax Court . ... '1
Nonetheless, the 1982 Act ultimately resulted in the creation of a new
trial court and empowered the President to appoint, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, sixteen judges who constituted an article I court
"' Marovitz, supra note 32, at 766. In a similar vein, Mr. Gausewitz favorably commented
regarding specialization in the patent field:
It is frequently said that a federal judge should have jurisdiction to preside
over any matter that is presented. This very natural attitude is also held by many
practicing attorneys concerning their competence to practice in every field except
one. The one exception, made by even the most ardent advocates of nonspecializa-
tion, is patent law. This is because patent law is an anomaly, a hybrid of law with
a rapidly proliferating technology. To treat patent law as a special, anomalous
case does not require or even suggest that there should be further specialization of
the judiciary.
Gausewitz, supra note 38, at 1090.
4" Miller, Future of the CCPA, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 676, 679 (1978).
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known as the United States Claims Court.48 The Act goes on to explain
that the judicial power of the USCC, except in congressional reference
cases, shall be exercised by a single judge.4 4
One of the most beneficial results to flow from this landmark legisla-
tion is the empowering of the judges of the USCC to render final deci-
sions. The beneficial effects go beyond the obvious and may even fashion
attitudinal changes. The new judges will be recognized as being in control
of the litigation, and the tendency to question or appeal such matters as
denials of extensions of time and rulings on pretrial discovery motions
will be reduced. This fact alone will go a long way towards securing the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action which should
be the goal of both the bench and the bar. Even more, while the trial
judges of the old Court of Claims were not empowered to act on disposi-
tive motions, the new USCC Rules permit such action with the hopeful
result that summary disposal can take place where warranted. 45 In addi-
tion, it is now possible for a judge of the USCC to render bench decisions.
While the typical patent case may only rarely lend itself to such treat-
ment, there are occasions when this may be possible. Such action will
obviously cut down on the pendency of cases before the court.
There are further advantages which result from the ability of the judge
to enter a final judgment. Heretofore, a trial judge of the Court of Claims
could only make non-binding recommended conclusions of law and find-
ings of fact. Because of the non-mandatory nature of the decisions of the
trial judge, the losing side, and often even the winning side, tended to
take extensive exceptions to them. This not only complicated matters at
the trial level, but also created problems in the appellate division. Not
only did the former arrangement provide little incentive to end the litiga-
tion after a decision at the trial level, it also promoted lengthy and com-
plicated appeals. Indeed, in some instances exceptions encompassed a
challenge on every point covered by the trial judge. Moreover, the inabil-
ity, and perhaps unwillingness, of the appellate division judges to provide
that a trial judge's findings of fact would not be set aside unless they
were clearly erroneous 46 may have encouraged litigants to take exceptions
to facts that would have gone uncontested in a conventional district
court/court of appeals relationship.
The ability to enter final judgments will also encourage the judges to
render shorter and more focused decisions. Under the former system in
which the trial judge could render only recommendations, the appellate
" Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105, 28 U.S.C. § 171(a).
" Id. § 105, 28 U.S.C. § 174.
" See Cl. Ct. R. 57.
" See Bringwald, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 639, 643 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ("[w]hile the
findings and opinion of a trial commissioner are entitled to much consideration and weight,
yet under our rules and procedure the court has the ultimate responsibility for determining
these matters.").
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division was aided by a full treatment of each issue raised by the parties.
In addition, the trial judges did not want to limit their decisions to a
single issue that the appellate level might conclude was not dispositive
and then face the possibility that the case would be remanded for treat-
ment of the other issues. In order to prevent such a remand, even the
most obscure issues were considered. Needless to say, this lengthened the
trial judge's report and required the expenditure of countless hours in
considering unnecessary issues and fashioning supernumerary findings of
fact.
While the above considerations will go far toward streamlining the han-
dling of patent cases in the new USCC, it will also require practitioners to
make certain adjustments. Lawyers must expect to conform their patent
practices to the manner in which cases are handled and tried in the fed-
eral district courts. Under the new system judges will be less likely to
monitor each of the moves of counsel and more likely to rely on opposing
counsel to call matters of importance to the court's attention. This is es-
pecially true at the pretrial discovery level where it will no longer be nec-
essary, as the old Court of Claims Rules required, for counsel to ask leave
to conduct discovery. 47
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent creation of the United States Claims Court, 127 years after
the birth of the Court of Claims, provides an opportunity to streamline
the trial procedures for handling claims against the United States govern-
ment. The trial judges have within their means the ability to give life to
the aspiration expressed in the court's Rule 1"' and provide the parties to
government litigation with a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action. Congress has spoken. It is now up to the judges of this
new court to carry out the legislative mandate in such a manner that the
Claims Court will become the standard by which judicial efficiency and
fairness are measured.
" See Cl. Ct. R. 26.
" Id. 1: "These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action."
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